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INTRODUCTION   
Pengelolaan Air Minum dan Sanitasi Berbasis 
Masyarakat (PAMSIMAS) or Community-Based Water 
Supply and Sanitation) is a community water sector 
program encouraging communal participation in 
managing drinking water and sanitation in Indonesia’s 
rural and peri-urban areas. The program refers to 
Indonesian Law No. 32 on Regional Government and 
Law No. 33 on Financial Balance between Central and 
Regional Government that mandates the government 
to provide basic necessities for the community, 
including drinking water and sanitation. Additionally, 
PAMSIMAS refers to Indonesia's commitment to 
achieving the Millennium Development Goals for the 
Water Supply and Sanitation Sector (currently the 
sixth goal of the Sustainable Development Goals). The 
program involves five Indonesianministries (Ministry of 
Public Works, National Development Planning Agency 
- BAPPENAS, Home Affairs, Health, and Villages for 
Disadvantaged Areas and Transmigration) with the 
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ABSTRACT 
National parks can be sensitive state-property areas since the surrounding 
communities generally need the parks' resources for their livelihood. This paper 
focuses on inequality and transaction costs in PAMSIMAS (Community-Based 
Water Supply and Sanitation), a water sector program in Indonesia’s rural and 
peri-urban areas. The method used is a case study of PAMSIMAS in Tajuk, a 
village adjacent to Mount Merbabu National Park in Semarang Regency, Central 
Java. The data were gathered from documentary studies, in-depth interviews, 
and observations, and were analyzed using transaction cost economics and 
institutional analysis. This study found that the rules of PAMSIMAS, especially 
water pricing mechanisms, enhanced water availability but could not diminish 
the uncertainty of water access and transaction costs born by water users. 
Inequalities of endowment, power, and information among the hamlets affected 
how PAMSIMAS was run. Mobilization of water resources is related to property 
rights, which should be well-defined. Still, there was an overlapping property 
institution of Mount Merbabu National Park forest and its water resources; thus, 
the water user groups had to bear different transaction costs. The study provides 
suggestions for providing broader 'rules of the game' in rural water management, 
recognizing local conditions and prospects, acknowledging community rights to 
resources, and developing inclusive community participation. 
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supports from international donor agencies, namely 
The World Bank and The Australian Government 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
By 2020, PAMSIMAS has reached thousands of 
villages and peri-urban areas throughout Indonesia. 
PAMSIMAS I started from 2008 to 2012, targeting 
7,402 rural and peri-urban areas, then PAMSIMAS II 
continued in 2013-2017, targeting 5,297 villages and 
peri-urban areas (The World Bank, 2014). To achieve 
the target of Universal Access to Drinking Water and 
Sanitation in 2019, PAMSIMAS III continued to 
increase the number of low-income rural and 
suburban residents who can access better water and 
sanitation facilities and better hygiene practices. The 
World Bank reports that the institutional sustainability 
of the PAMSIMAS approach shows positive signs, and 
even 97% of regencies replicate the path outside the 
target communities (Wray, 2019). With this success 
stories, this program will continue in the years to 
come. 
Many researches and evaluations on PAMSIMAS 
implementation have shown success stories of the 
program, including increasing access to drinking water 
and community participation. It is now easier for rural 
communities to get clean water and sanitation facilities 
(Pratama & Isnanik, 2018; Sitranata, 2016). This is 
coupled with the high utilization and maintenance of 
water supply and sanitation infrastructure (Fitriyani & 
Rahdriawan, 2015; Suroso, 2018). Participation in 
PAMSIMAS is in the form of community involvement in 
decision-making and the spending of energy and 
money for the program's sustainability (Chaerunissa, 
2014). PAMSIMAS has encouraged success in 
increasing community participation in water supply 
and sanitation that, in fact, in some areas, the 
achievement of the program has exceeded the targets 
(Asminar, 2019; Chaerunissa, 2014). 
Although many success stories of PAMSIMAS have 
been demonstrated by the above studies, yet other 
studies and evaluations also show several issues in the 
program implementation that need to be addressed, 
including water quality and inequality problems. In 
several rural and urban areas, clinical trials of water 
quality are critical because of inadequate water quality 
(Fitriyani & Rahdriawan, 2015). PAMSIMAS 
implementation evaluation also shows that the 
development of PAMSIMAS infrastructure has not 
been evenly distributed (Suroso, 2018). In Pati 
Regency, for example, only 26.85% of villages have 
access to the program (Suroso, 2018).  
Research on PAMSIMAS implementation in the 
areas adjacent to national parks has not been done 
much. National parks can be sensitive state-property 
areas since the surrounding communities generally 
need the parks' resources for their livelihood. To 
protect wildlife and biodiversity, state institutions 
restrict human access to parks, so behind the success 
of conservation, conflicts and violence between the 
state agency and community often occur (De Pourcq 
et al., 2017; Mukherjee, 2009). The root of the conflict 
varies greatly, not only from the state's political 
priorities but also from various actors with various 
interests and needs (Sandlos, 2007; Vedeld et al., 
2012). Besides, several studies found that 
conservation benefits through national parks may 
increase local economic inequality (Ntuli & 
Muchapondwa, 2017; Tumusiime & Sjaastad, 2014). 
Actors with more wealth or power are more likely to 
have more access to the national park resources than 
the poor ones. 
Sharing the benefits and costs among individuals 
in resource use is significant in collective action. The 
inequality of endowments may affect the distribution 
of benefits and costs (Bardhan et al., 2018). The 
distribution of access rights to the common-pool 
resources and its benefits tends to reflect the 
distribution of wealth endowments, so wealthier users 
could benefit more from managing resources than 
relatively poorer users (Kurian & Dietz, 2013). 
Economic endowments, social norms, and social 
perceptions such as class, caste, ethnicity, gender can 
also affect how resources are allocated. Unequal 
distribution of access rights may lead to unstable and 
hostile relations among individuals. Thus individuals 
with fewer endowments will feel uncertain about their 
future rights (Baland & Platteau, 2018). 
Understanding the performance of water sector 
programs requires a thorough cost analysis, not only 
the costs of the program implementation process but 
also the transaction costs involved (Laurenceau et al., 
2009). McCann (2013) defined transaction costs as the 
resource costs of creating and using policies by 
defining, assigning, maintaining, and transferring 
property rights. Meanwhile, Ostrom (2015) 
distinguished transaction costs by comparing them 
with transformation activities/costs. Transformation 
activities change a situation into something else, such 
as building a water reservoir in an irrigation system. 
Meanwhile, transaction activities are directed at (i) 
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information, and (iii) gaining strategic over other 
advantages. All transformation activities in collective 
action will include transaction activities, or,as some 
may call it, collective lobbying activities (Meinzen-Dick 
et al., 2002). They require transaction costs for which 
large amounts of time, money, and energy are 
consumed. 
The focus of transaction cost economics is the 
disputes that may arise when individuals, 
characterized by bounded rationality and opportunistic 
behavior, are involved in contractual relationships 
(Williamson, 2019). Relationships between individuals 
who do not have the same information, incentives, 
resources, and social norms may give rise to 
transaction activities and the resulting costs (Ostrom, 
2015). This situation encourages some individuals to 
adopt opportunistic strategies to obtain unequal 
benefits at others' expense, namely "free ride," rent-
seeking, and corruption. 
Many studies have widely described transaction 
costs addressing water management, water market, 
and policy on water (Deng et al., 2018; Njiraini et al., 
2017; Zhang et al., 2013). Arifin (2006) explicitly 
described the transaction costs of the upstream and 
downstream relations in community-based forest and 
water management in protected areas. However, the 
study has not linked the transaction costs with the 
problem of inequalities between actors in resources 
management. Inequalities are very likely to drive an 
increase in transaction costs, thereby reducing the 
level of certainty in sustainable water management 
(Ostrom, 2015). 
This study examines inequalities affecting the 
efficiency of transaction costs in community-based 
water management by taking a case study of 
PAMSIMAS program implementation. A better 
understanding of the performance of PAMSIMAS in 
sensitive areas like national parks will provide input for 
future development of the programs and public 
services. This study is expected to give policy 
recommendations, especially in improving water 
supply and sanitation programs in rural areas. 
RESEARCH METHOD  
The method used was a case study of PAMSIMAS 
program implementation in Tajuk, a village adjacent 
to Mount Merbabu National Park in Getasan District, 
Semarang Regency, Central Java Province, Indonesia. 
The parts of the research problem and its relationship 
are stated as follows. The issue of inequality has 
relevance to transaction costs. Inequalities in this 
study are the power, endowment, and information 
owned by water user groups involved in the 
PAMSIMAS program. Meanwhile, transaction costs are 
costs from lobbying and negotiation activities to 
access water resources that built contractual 
relationships among water users. 
Data were collected using the triangulation 
method.  The documentary study was used to obtain 
data related to the general overview of the village and 
PAMSIMAS Program. The document sources were 
from the village government, the Ministry of Public 
Works, and Mount Merbabu National Park).  In-depth 
interviews to obtain primary data by interviewing key 
respondents such as the village apparatus, national 
park staff, and water users in each hamlet (sub-
village).Observations were done to obtain data related 
to the biophysical condition of the village, community 
socio-economic activities, and water management 
infrastructure. 
This study used transaction cost economics and 
institutional analysis, considering that transaction 
costs efficiency is essential for all organization forms, 
including those involved in managing common-pool 
resources (Ostrom, 2015). In this study, the said 
institutions were (i) the property rights regulating 
access to forest and water resources in the zone of the 
national park, and (ii) the program rules in PAMSIMAS 
providing coordination functions for community-based 
water management. It was then reviewed whether 
under these two institutions, water users' transaction 
costs to get water access becoming more efficient.   
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Description of The Study Area   
Tajuk Village is located on the slope of Mount 
Merbabu, Getasan District, Semarang Regency, 
Central Java Province, Indonesia (Figure 1) and has a 
wealth of potential resources. Mount Merbabu has 
about 5,725 ha of dense forest areas which consists of 
pines, acacia, flowers, and bushes. These forest areas 
are the primary and upstream catchment areas of 17 
rivers in Magelang, Semarang, and Boyolali Regencies 
(Gunawan et al., 2013). The slopes of Mount Merbabu 
have many springs, which release 10,055 liters/second 
of water, so that in a year, there is around 312.75 
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has abundant water resources that the local 
community can utilize. 
The village consists of eleven hamlets (sub-
villages) whose elevations range from 1,000 meters to 
1,800 meters above sea level and has an average air 
temperature of 13 to 23o Celsius. Seven of the eleven 
hamlets are directly adjacent to the border of the 
Mount Merbabu National Park. This village has many 
springs located both in the village area and in the 
national park zone. The local community recognizes 
the riparian right, where every hamlet with a land 
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Table 1.  Major Changes in the Property System of Mount Merbabu Forest  
Period Changes in Forest Status and its Management Institutions 
Pre-Independence Era  
Before the 20th century Tribal rules. 
1906 Set as ‘the forbidden forest’ (hutan larangan/tutupan) by the Dutch Colonial Government. 
1908 Designation of forest boundaries based on Proces verbaal van grensregeling (Berita Acara Tata 
Batas/Notes of the Boundary) for Kedu Area (in Muntilan and Tegalrejo District) and Boyolali 
Regency. 
1915 Designation of forest boundaries for Semarang Regency area, including Village communities, 
lived in the forest called enclaves. 
1930 Recognition endorsement of designated boundaries as having de facto and de jure status, 
resulting from Grensprojectkaart (forest mapping). 
Post-Independence Era  
1959-1963 Forest management by Forestry Office at the regency level.  
1963-2004 Forest management by Perhutani, a BUMN (state-owned enterprise) that managed most forest 
areas in Java.  
2004-present 
 
Forest management by Central Government through the Ministry of Forestry following the change 
of forest function into national park which designated zones system with specific provisions for 
each zone. 
Source: From various sources and interviews with local people and a staff of Mount Merbabu National Park 
 
 
Most of the villagers are indigenous people, 
inhabiting the area for several generations, so they 
have strong social ties, both with fellow residents 
(bonding social capital) and nature. Communities 
depend on forest resources, such as wood for 
fuelwood, grass for animal feed, and water from 
springs located in the national park's forest zone. 
Around 4,007 people live in Tajuk, and mostly 
(87.44% of the total workforce) work as farmers or 
laborers. Only a small proportion of workers are fully 
employed in other sectors, such as civil servants, 
military/police officers, tailors, drivers, private sector 
employees, carpenters, masons, and private teachers. 
Collective action for water resources management 
occurs independently in each hamlet. The rules that 
define the tasks and participation among them are 
developed and enforced on their own. Thus, in 
general, there is only one water supply system in each 
hamlet. Some hamlets use neighborhood groups at 
the local level, such as RT (Rukun 
Tetangga/neighborhood association) or RW (Rukun 
Warga/citizens association), as water resources 
management organizations. Several other hamlets 
form a special team to manage water resources. 
Each hamlet's independent management is due to 
geographical and administrative boundaries and each 
hamlet's social identity. Geographical boundaries that 
separate the hamlets include rivers, agricultural land, 
and forests. The Dusun (hamlet) identity is more 
potent than village identity, even though all people live 
in the same village. Phrases like Wong Pulihan or 
Wong Kaliajeng (a native or inhabitant of Pulihan 
Hamlet or Kaliajeng Hamlet) indicate a social identity 
embedded in their collective memory. Another social 
identity entrenches in their belief in the communal 
tradition, i.e.Saparan. Each hamlet has its own belief 
about a good day to celebrate this tradition that refers 
to their respective Danyang (the village founder or 
protector spirit) 
Institutional Arrangement  
1. Mount Merbabu National Park 
In 1980, coinciding with the World Conservation 
Strategy's announcement, Indonesia's government 
implemented the national park concept. The criteria 
for determining national parks in Indonesia are 
regulated and confirmed in Law No. 5 of 1990 
concerning Conservation of Living Natural Resources 
and their Ecosystems and Law No. 41 of 1999 
concerning Forestry and various implementing 
regulations.   
In terms of ownership, national parks are generally 
state property, although the states sometimes give 
restitution to indigenous people's land (Curry, 2009). 
In Indonesia, the central government is the leading 
manager of national parks through the Ministry of 
Forestry. Meanwhile, the technical implementation 
unit at the site is the National Park Office under the 
Directorate General of Natural Resources 
Conservation. Along the way, based on the agreement 
of the WCPA (World Commission on Protected Areas) 
Congress in 1993, conservation areas cannot only be 
managed by a single institution. The management 
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community around the area (Dunggio & Gunawan, 
2009). 
The property system of Mount Merbabu forest has 
changed several times. Table 1 shows institutional 
changes on Mount Merbabu forest concerning its 
property system. After Indonesia's independence, it 
was managed by the Forestry Department of 
Indonesia at the regency level. Subsequently, in 1963, 
Perhutani (state-owned enterprise) managed some 
parts of the forest as a timber production source. 
Finally, in 2004, the Ministry of Forestry of Indonesia 
took over the management and changed the forest 
function as a national park. 
The government divided the the national park area 
into several zones: (i) the core zone, i.e. a part the 
national park that is protected, serving to protect the 
representation of the original and unique biodiversity; 
(ii) the jungle zone, i.e. a part that, due to the location, 
the conditions and its potential, can support the 
interests of conservation in the core zone and the zone 
of utilization; (iii) the utilization zone, i.e. a part where 
the natural conditions and potentials are mainly 
utilized for the benefit of nature tourism and other 
environmental conditions/services; (iv) traditional 
zone, i.e.  a part that is determined for the benefit of 
traditional use by the local community who due to their 
historical background has a strong dependency on 
natural resources; (v) rehabilitation zone, i.e. a part 
that needs to be restored since the living community 
and its ecosystem is damaged; and (vi) cultural zone, 
i.e. a part in which there are religious sites, cultural 
and or historical heritage used for religious activities, 
and protection of cultural or historical values.  
Institutional change of the forest into Mount 
Merbabu National Park affects the relationship 
between the local community and the forest and its 
resources. The central government established a 
government agency responsible for the management 
of national park. Local people's activities must be 
adjusted according to the national park's zone 
designation, although most of them do not understand 
this system. Some hamlet residents are still allowed to 
manage the land called lacen in the utilization zone, 
which used to be obtained from the community-based 
forest management program (PHBM) when the 
government organizes the Merbabu mountain forest 
area as a production forest (Gunawan et al., 2013). 
Thus, local people may still benefit from forest 
resources but must comply with state regulations and 
government agencies responsible for the forests. For 
instance, in the context of local wood needs, the 
community cannot cut down and take advantage of 
forest trees, even trees that have already fallen. There 
is a rule that fallen trees must be returned to nature 
by burying them in the forest's ground. Entering the 
woods with a rifle is also illegal, while incidentally, the 
local people need to drive out monkeys that often 
destroy their crops.  
The constraints that the government imposes have 
sometimes created tension between government 
agencies carrying out state duties and the locals 
fighting for their livelihoods. For instance, in Sokowolu 
Hamlet, Tajuk Village, a physical fight between six 
national park forest rangers had occurred in Sokowolu. 
The violence that led to the burning of a motorbike 
belonging to one of the officers was a response to 
allegations of an elderly villager as being committed in 
illegal logging. Patrol officers also detained a local 
resident for carrying a rifle which the resident used to 
repel a herd of monkeys that destroyed agricultural 
land. The officers finally released the local resident 
after the hamlet leader threatened to mobilize the 
crowd to the detention location. These incidents are in 
line with the research of De Pourcq et al. (2017) and 
Mukherjee (2009), namely that conservation policies 
in national park areas that are insensitive to the needs 
of local communities are very likely to cause conflict 
and violence between local communities and the state 
agency. 
There has not been much change in how the local 
community access water sourced from the national 
park, but it must comply with applicable regulations. 
The community can still use water, but only in 
permitted zones such as the utilization and traditional 
zones. The locals cannot build and/or rebuild water 
storage tanks in the restricted zone. There are also 
variations in how the hamlets in Tajuk Village get their 
water from the national park areas. Apart from being 
related to the state-property embedded in the national 
park, this variation is related to the principle of riparian 
rights recognized by village communities which means 
the people closest to the water source are more 
entitled to access these resources (Craig, 2012). 
Common variations are (i) communities directly 
adjacent to the national park can access water straight 
from the source, and (ii) hamlet communities that are 
not directly adjacent to the national park can access 
water, but through coordination with hamlets directly 
neighboring the national park. Some hamlets also 
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the village, such as Salatiga City areas, which are 
relatively remote. 
2. PAMSIMAS 
In 2013, Tajuk Village received a grant from the 
government for the PAMSIMAS program by complying 
with the government's strict rules. These strict rules 
are part of an effort to change people's behavior and 
habits within a development project framework (Li, 
2016). The village must compete with other villages in 
the regency. They must make program proposals to 
Semarang Regency government and meet some 
requirements set by the policy makers (the 
government and the World Bank). The requirements 
included (i) villages were capable of providing 
Community Empowerment cadres in the Water and 
Sanitation sector; (ii) the community had to provide 
an endowment fund in 4% in cash and 16% in kind; 
(iii) the community must get used to healthy sanitation 
behavior and bear the costs of transformation 
activities. After fulfilling these requirements, Tajuk 
Village received a grant from the State Budget 
amounting to 216 million rupiahs.  
Apart from the rules that the village must meet 
before program implementation, other rules needed to 
be implemented during program implementation. 
These rules were embedded in the technical manuals 
for ensuring the performance of PAMSIMAS. To 
implement these regulations, program implementers 
received various training and technical guidance 
facilitated by the government. The rules that 
significantly change water management under 
PAMSIMAS Tajuk Village are (i) the adoption of a 
water pricing mechanism; (ii) the obligation for the 
community involved in PAMSIMAS to install a water 
use meter; and (iii) the establishment of Water Supply 
and Sanitation Facility Management Agency 
(BPSPAMS) as a new collective-choice body. Table 2 
shows more details regarding the major rules under 
the PAMSIMAS program in Tajuk Village. 
Of these main rules in PAMSIMAS, the rule that 
makes water availability higher is the volumetric-
based water pricing mechanism. The mechanism can 
provide incentives for more efficient water use 
(Narasimhan, 2016). The users must bear the 
opportunity cost of using water. Based on an interview 
with a farmer, water use became more efficient after 
the implementationof PAMSIMAS. Some farmers said 
that they were worried about using water excessively 
so that the costs would be high. Thus, water is more 
available, especially for farmers living in the lower 
terrain who used to face water shortage. In other 
words, the market-like institution under PAMSIMAS 
has resulted in water use efficiency, which means that 
all water users get sufficient water.  
However, the problem usually arises with regard to 
how a reasonable price can be determined (Chen et 
al., 2013). Initially, the community responded to this 
rule with pros and cons. Most of the farmers witha lot 
of livestock objected to the regulation because they 
were worried that they would pay a high-water price. 
Meanwhile, people who mostly live in lower areas 
strongly agreed. They considered that people living in 
higher areas used water excessively. Thus, residents 
in lower areas often experienced water shortages. The 
whole community ultimately agrees with the rules 
regarding the cost of water as long as they decide it 
themselves, and the water price will not be as high as 
in urban areas 
 
 
Table 2.  Major Rules of Water Management under PAMSIMAS in Tajuk Village 
Major Rules  Consequences 
1. The adoption of a water 
pricing mechanism (a 
market-like mechanism) 
 A volumetric water pricing is enacted (water charge is based on the amount of water used).  
 All water users have to pay monthly abonnement and the charge of water counted per 
cubic meter 
2. The obligation to install 
new technology, mostly 
water meter in each house 
 
 The water system is designed as a closed pipeline network to control water transfer. 
 Smaller pipes connect the main water storage tank to water users' houses. With a gravity 
system, water flows from the water storage tank to the downstream area. 
 Water meter/calculator is installed in each house to count the amount of water usage per 
household.  
 Water users who have installed this machine have automatically joined the program. 
3. The establishment of a new 
collective-choice body 
 Changes in stewardship in water management from the leaders of RTs to the BPSPAMS, as 
a new collective choice body.  
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Inequalities 
With the amount of the fund granted (216 million 
rupiahs), the program could only reach a limited 
number of houses in the village. Of the 969 houses in 
Tajuk Village, only 207 could benefit from PAMSIMAS. 
Thus, only two hamlets, namely Hamlets of Pulihan 
and Kaliajeng, could be involved in the program. All 
houses (140 houses) in Pulihan and a number of the 
houses (67 houses) in Kaliajeng got the privilege to 
join the program. Besides, two parties outside the 
village, an agricultural company and a social 
foundation, were allowed to join at their own expense. 
Table 3 shows the groups of water users in the 
PAMSIMAS program in Tajuk Village. 
 






Pulihan inhabitants  140 Domestic use and 
agricultural production 
Kaliajeng inhabitants 67 Domestic use and 
agricultural production 
Agricultural company 1 Livestock production 
business 
Social institution 1 Social activities and 
hospitality business 
 
The two hamlets joining PAMSIMAS, Pulihan and 
Kaliajeng, have differences in bio-physical condition 
and endowment. Pulihan has a better advantage in 
biophysical conditions since it has several abundant 
alternative water sources in its area. Its location is also 
in the upper terrain and adjacent to the national park 
zone where the spring for PAMSIMAS locates. With the 
principle of riparian rights believed among the 
villagers, Pulihan has the right to fetch water from the 
closest park's zone. Meanwhile, Kaliajeng is located 
lower than Pulihan. Although it has several alternative 
water sources, it is not sufficient for all inhabitants. 
Kaliajeng has quite a large spring, but its location is in 
an area under its residential terrain, so they cannot 
use a gravity system that facilitates water distribution. 
Moreover, they do not have sufficient technology to 
drain water from the bottom to the top. Therefore, 
Kaliajeng must seek access to water from Pulihan.   
Biophysical conditions and endowments of 
different water users in the village have alluded to who 
will receive more benefits from PAMSIMAS. Ostrom 
(2010) suggested that biophysical and material 
conditions may affect how resources and property are 
distributed or restricted. With that unequal situation, 
Pulihan got more opportunities to allow all its residents 
could be involved in PAMSIMAS, while Kaliajeng did 
not get the same chance. Kaliajeng must get 
‘generosity’ from Pulihan to get water access. This 
confirms Kurian & Dietz's (2013) research results that 
resource users with more endowments will benefit 
more than those who do not.  
Apart from biophysical conditions, power 
asymmetries also affect how development programs 
are implemented in Tajuk. García & Bodin (2019) 
suggested that participation in various forums is the 
key to influence decision-making in water governance. 
Pulihan has become more robust due to several local 
political elites residing there. The village office is 
located in Pulihan, and some people holding strategic 
positions as village officials also lived in Pulihan, 
including the village head and village secretary. 
Besides, a resident of Pulihan worked for national park 
office and all members of BPSPAM as the collective 
choice body were Pulihan residents. These strategic 
positions gave Pulihan more opportunities to 
participate and more power to influence decision-
making processes than other hamlets.  
Power asymmetries, in turn, also intersect with 
asymmetric information of different groups (Saam, 
2007). Since elites' strategic positions were mostly 
concentrated in Pulihan, information on development 
programs, especially from the top-level government 
and the national park agency, ranmostly to Pulihan. 
The national park staff from Pulihan mostly 
coordinated more conservation programs with the 
government and various civil society organizations 
(CSOs) outside the village. This unequal access to 
information is very likely to impact development 
programs significantly, especially if it is not 
transparent (Lightfoot & Wisniewski, 2014). A hamlet 
head who did not receive the PAMSIMAS program 
even expressed a despair feeling and stated, in a 
satirical tone, "let Pulihan be full first." This shows how 
Pulihan enjoyed more and earlier development 
programs than other hamlets.  
Furthermore, there is a power imbalance between 
the surrounding rural communities and the national 
park management. In the context of state-centered 
management of national parks, the state has 
expanded its power (Lunstrum, 2013). To access 
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communities must follow rules that promoted 
conservation. Even though local communities 
recognized riparian rights and felt they own water 
resources close to them, the national park resources 
are legally a state property. Enforcement usually 
follows the zoning system of the national park and the 
restrictive rules embedded in it. What is often worrying 
is the exerciseof law enforcement with a militaristic 
approach, which sometimes worsens the relationship 
between the national park and the surrounding village 
communities (Lunstrum, 2014). 
Transaction Costs and Uncertainty 
Unequal relations among water user groups in 
PAMSIMAS increased transaction activities which in 
turn increase costs incurred. This is in line with 
Ostrom's insight (2015) that transaction costs are very 
likely to be high if individuals have different 
information, incentives, resources, and social norms. 
As described above, Pulihan and Kaliajeng have 
differences in biophysical conditions, power, and 
information. Meanwhile, there is an imbalance in 
power relations between the state that manages the 
national park and the surrounding village 
communities. Characteristics of water user groups, 
such as bounded rationality and opportunism, also 
impact increasing transaction costs in the 
development program (Coggan et al., 2013). In the 
case of PAMSIMAS in Tajuk, user groups prioritized the 
interests of their respective groups.  
In the water market, property rights significantly 
affect transaction costs (Williamson, 2015). The 
PAMSIMAS water source in Tajuk is located in the 
national park area. There is an overlapping 
institutional arrangement to this water source. The 
rural communities believed they had the right to use 
the water source because they recognized riparian 
rights. Pulihan is close to the water source, therefore 
acknowledging ownership to the resource and rights 
to transfer access and distribute water to other parties 
they agree with. Meanwhile, the government 
considered that it is legally a state property. The 
parties who wished to gain water access should carry 
out transaction activities and incur transaction costs. 
There were several forms of transaction costs in 
implementing PAMSIMAS in Tajuk. Firstly, transaction 
activities in the form of lobbying for the collective 
interests of each water user group. Kaliajeng needed 
to negotiate with Pulihan to keep getting water 
allocation and getting involved in the PAMSIMAS 
program. The head of Kaliajeng hamlet met directly 
with the village secretary, a resident of Pulihan, 
several times to discuss the possibility of Kaliajeng 
getting access to water. These meetings were held at 
the village office and the village secretary’s house. 
During the dry season, Kaliajeng would ask Pulihan to 
allocate water to them. In the rainy season, Kaliajeng 
would ask them to stop the distribution because the 
water sourced from the springs in Kaliajeng has met 
all its residents' needs. Meanwhile, although not as 
often as Kaliajeng, Pulihan must also negotiate with 
the national park authorities to ensure that they could 
still access water sourced from the national park area. 
The lobbies were facilitated by the non-civil servant 
national park staff living in Pulihan. 
The lobby and search for information activities 
required money and effort. Money was explicitly 
needed, especially for the cost of transportation. In 
every effort to find information, a hamlet 
representative visited the targeted parties, so they had 
to leave their job. Implicitly, costs were incurred in 
actors' labor and time spent in information seeking or 
supervision. If converted to the average standard 
wages per day received by local people as laborers 
working in fields/ agricultural land, the transaction 
costs incurred were around 60,000 - 70,000 rupiahs 
for each time information inquiry process was done. 
Therefore, Kaliajeng spent more time and resources to 
negotiate with local elites and BPSPAMS. Negotiations 
allowed Kaliajeng to continue to access water through 
PAMSIMAS under the coordination of Pulihan. 
 




Tariff of Using 
Water 
 rupiah/month rupiah/m3 
Pulihan inhabitants  1,000 200 
Kaliajeng inhabitants 3,000 200 
Agricultural company - 3,000 
Social institution - 3,000 
 
Secondly, other transaction cost was in the form of 
contractual relationships among groups of water 
users. Volumetric-based water pricing rules applied to 
all water users and were managed by BPSPAMS as the 
collective choice body. The two hamlets were involved 
in a contractual relationship through the settlementof 
different water tariffs. Table 4 shows that the costs 
incurred by each sub-group are uneven. As a part of 
the unwritten contractual agreement, the residents of 
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Pulihan. To continue to get water distribution, 
however, Kaliajeng must agree to the water tariff 
decision determined by Pulihan. 
Following the transaction costs spent, there was 
uncertainty regarding water access for each hamlet 
involved in PAMSIMAS. As embedded in riparian rights, 
residents of Pulihan had the right to be more 
prioritized over water access than Kaliajeng or other 
parties. This means that water users with more 
endowments will benefit from the management 
(Kurian & Dietz, 2013). Thus, Kaliajeng depended 
more on the 'generosity' of Pulihan. While unwritten, 
there was a mutual agreement between Pulihan and 
Kaliajeng in which Pulihan would be given a priority in 
getting water supply during the dry season. Kaliajeng's 
condition was relatively weak because access to water 
was only obtained after Pulihan's water needs were 
fulfilled first. This indicates that the group with lower 
power or endowment will feel uncertain in getting 
resources (Baland & Platteau, 2018).  
This uncertain situation ended in 2018 when the 
tension between Pulihan and Kaliajeng peaked. 
Pulihan asked for a tariff increase for Kaliajeng of 
5,000 rupiahs per month due to the construction and 
reparation of pipes. Kaliajeng objected this unilateral 
decision, so they were not willing to pay. Pulihan then 
decided to stop water distribution to Kaliajeng. After 
five years of PAMSIMAS in Tajuk Village, Kaliajeng 
finally did not join the program. Unfortunately, the 
equipment such as water meters and pipes built in 
Kaliajeng are now not used. Kaliajeng eventually 
lobbied a hamlet in a neighboring village to get water 
allocation outside the PAMSIMAS program.  
Meanwhile, because water mobilization is also 
related to property rights, Pulihan had to compromise 
with the national park agency to access water from the 
park's zones. In this case, the state has more power 
because the forest and its resources belong to the 
state (Lunstrum, 2013). The government agency of 
national park has once stated their willingness to take 
over the water management. After one of the staff 
learned that water service revenue was quite 
significant, especially that which was paid by the social 
foundation,the national park agency tried to capture 
this opportunity. Responding to this move, Pulihan 
tried to lobby the agency to keep managing the park's 
water resources. Fortunately, thanks to a resident of 
Pulihan who was working for the national park agency, 
the agency was still willing to accommodate Pulihan's 
aspirations.  Thus, without having state’s recognition 
on joint ownership over forest resources, Pulihan 
remained facing uncertainty regarding water access to 
the national park zone. 
Research Implication 
Management of common-pool resources, such as 
forests and water, always requires appropriate 
institutions. Common-pool resources refer to goods or 
services in which users compete highly to use them or 
find it difficult or expensive to restrict other users from 
using them (Ostrom, 2015). Institutions are the ‘rules 
of the game’ limiting human action and influencing 
social behavior (North, 2016). The rule itself has some 
dimensions that define the flow of income and costs 
and give authority to the decision-making process. 
Those dimensions affect the distribution of assets and 
power. Although not always efficient, institutions can 
reduce uncertainty because rules can control 
individuals' and organizations' decision-making 
processes (Schotch, 2018). Therefore, institutions are 
substantial since the level of certainty and 
sustainability will, in turn, enable cooperation and 
create community economic development. 
There are two critical institutions for the 
management of common-pool resources: (i) those 
that provide coordination and (ii) property rights 
(Meinzen-Dick, 2014). Coordination is needed to 
arrange a particular approach to resource 
management. Coordination function can be provided 
by the state, collective action, or markets. At the same 
time, property rights institutions are needed to define 
the benefit stream of water resources, including 
access, management, distribution, and exclusion. 
Many resources are held under certain property rights 
regimes, which may combine the characteristics of two 
or more of these types: open-access control (no 
management intervention), private property (market-
based system), state property (managed by the 
central government/state), and common property 
(controlled by the identifiable community based on 
local rules) (Everard & Dupont, 2018). 
PAMSIMAS encourages community-based drinking 
water supply and sanitation, so the coordination 
institution for collective action stands out in this 
program. Collective action refers to actions taken 
together by a group of people whose goal is to 
improve their condition and achieve common goals 
(Ostrom, 2015). However, in achieving the common 
goal, the actors in the collective action may follow the 
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engaging in opportunistic behavior (Hardin, 2015). 
Thus, successful water resources management 
through collective action requires institutional 
arrangements and certain characteristics of the 
resource system, water user groups, and a supportive 
external environment (Ostrom, 2015). And one of the 
most significant is that property rights should be well 
defined (Everard & Dupont, 2018). Property rights will 
determine whether or not uncertainty can be reduced, 
and resource management will be sustainable. 
The case study's results indicated that two 
institutional arrangements intersect with the 
implementation of PAMSIMAS in the research location. 
Firstly, the property system change strengthens the 
determination of the national park, where the place of 
the springs for the PAMSIMAS program is located. 
Determining the status of Mount Merbabu as a 
national park means maintaining state property, which 
also means strengthening the state's power 
(Lunstrum, 2013). On the other hand, the surrounding 
rural communities acknowledge riparian rights 
through which they believe that the water source 
closest to their hamlet is their right (Craig, 2012). 
Secondly, coordinating rules for resource 
management are agreed in PAMSIMAS. The main rules 
are adopting the water price mechanism, the 
obligation to use meter technology, and the 
establishment of BPSPAMS as the new collective-
choice body. The rule of water prices in PAMSIMAS has 
increased water availability because the mechanism 
encourages users to use water efficiently 
(Narasimhan, 2016). Interestingly, village 
administration's role in this regard was completely 
absent, especially in defining broader “rules of game” 
as a reference for operational rule-making by 
PAMSIMAS in managing water resources. The 
"absence" of the village government in managing 
water resources has a context in the local political 
dynamics, namely the public authorities at the lowest 
level are already politicized in such a way of held 
hostage by local political interests during the village 
head election event (Istiyani, 2014). 
Furthermore, the study results also showed several 
inequalities in the program implementation, namely 
inequalities in bio-physical condition, power, and 
information. The difference in biophysical locations 
among hamlets significantly impacts water access, 
either weakening or strengthening their capacity to 
control its distribution. The strategic positions that 
actors have in water user groups also influence the 
power and information they get. A group of water 
users has more chances to participate in the project's 
decision-making, enabling them to control the project 
more strongly (García & Bodin, 2019). The inequalities 
coupled with local elites' opportunistic behavior have 
hindered equal cooperation between water users 
(Baland & Platteau, 2018). The case shows that the 
group with more endowments will get more benefits 
from the program (Kurian & Dietz, 2013). 
Even though rules have helped rural communities 
to increase water availability, PAMSIMAS cannot 
reduce the uncertainty of water access and transaction 
costs borne by water users. The group of users who 
have fewer endowments has to deliver higher 
transaction costs. They have to lobby groups with 
higher endowments to keep access to water. Thus, 
user groups with lower endowments are trapped in 
uncertain conditions regarding their secured access to 
water (Baland & Platteau, 2018).  
Given this situation, the presence of public 
authority at the local level to resolve disputes, define 
the public goods, and mediate conflicting interests 
among community members is necessary. In fact, 
such authority falls under “the principle of subsidiarity” 
as stated in the Law no. 6 of 2014 concerning Village. 
This principle, along with the “principle of recognition”, 
gives the village administration a wide range of 
authority to govern and make decisions on public 
matters at the local scale to achieve the maximum 
prosperity of the community (Shohibuddin, 2016; 
Shohibuddin et al., 2017).  
Unfortunately, the village government's absence in 
governing water access and issuing village regulation 
had resulted in a win-lose scenario among different 
groups of water users having conflicting interests 
regarding water distribution. Such scenario was finally 
pursued by Pulihan hamlet as they demanded a tariff 
increase of 5,000 rupiahs per month from water users 
in Kaliajeng hamlet. This increase was justified by the 
required costs for financing the reparation and 
construction of water pipes. However, the group of 
water users in Kaliajeng hamlet objected such demand 
and deemed it as a unilateral decision, so they were 
unwilling to pay. Following this, Pulihan then decided 
to stop the distribution of water to Kaliajeng hamlet. 
As a result, after five years of PAMSIMAS, water access 
for the low endowment group was cut off, so that all 
equipment that have been invested in the program has 
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On the other hand, property system of forest and 
water resources also explains how the uncertainty of 
water access and transaction costs remain continued 
(Williamson, 2015; Womble & Hanemann, 2020). 
There is an overlapping and even conflicting situation 
in the property system concerning land and water 
resources in the national park area, namely state-
property as defined by national law and common 
property based on riparian rights as recognized by 
local rural communities. Furthermore, the undefined 
forest land boundaries have led to uncertain 
institutions of coordination in water management, not 
only for PAMSIMAS program but also for the village 
administration in general.   
Based on the results of the case study, there are 
several research implications that we can draw. First, 
water usage charging in PAMSIMAS can increase 
water availability for more users, but the important 
issue that requires attention is the rational and 
appropriate pricing. Pricing needs to integrate public 
interest and economic benefits applicable to the 
project (Chen et al., 2013). This also means that the 
determination of water usage charging must pay 
attention to water users' interests related to the ease 
of access to water and cost recovery for maintaining 
water infrastructure (Narasimhan, 2016).   
Secondly, in determining water usage charging 
based on water user’s interests, local regulation and 
village governance which can provide broader “rule of 
game” in the water management should be put in 
place. This will require the village administration’s 
active engagement in resolving disputes, enhancing 
public goods, and mediating conflicting interests. 
Doing so would not let the rule-making process in 
PAMSIMAS program be greatly determined by some 
sort of “free fight” mechanism.  
Thirdly, policymakers need to recognize the 
importance of understanding the biophysical 
conditions, institutions, and attributes of communities 
in the project area (Ostrom, 2015). Inequality of 
biophysical conditions, including land ownership, is a 
structural condition that constitutes a challenge both 
to conservation and development agendas; thus, it 
must be fully considered in the policy-making process 
(Benra & Nahuelhual, 2019). The water management 
policies under PAMSIMAS in the study area ignored the 
ownership gap among hamlets and groups' 
heterogeneity. Mobilization of water resources (as a 
prerequisite for markets or market-like institutions) in 
Tajuk is intricate, so ignoring this will require the water 
users to bear higher transaction costs. Implementing 
sensitive and flexible water management based on 
local conditions and prospects while strengthening 
local administration may protect the future of rural 
communities and the resources they depend 
(Rejekiningrum & Kartiwa, 2018). 
Fourthly, government’s recognition of common 
property rights is essential to provide rural 
communities with incentives and opportunities to 
manage their resources sustainably in the long run. 
Mobilization of collective action in resource 
management depends significantly on property rights, 
which must be well defined (Everard & Dupont, 2018). 
The massive lobbying activities carried out by the local 
community and the national park government agency 
indicate the uncertainty of water rights for the 
communities (Williamson, 2019). Therefore, it is vital 
to recognize communities' rights and to determine 
water sources and forest resources' boundaries. 
Gunawan et al. (2013) suggested establishing a buffer 
zone that can solve the conflict between conservation 
agenda and surrounding rural communities' needs, 
along with increasing community-based management 
and utilization of environmental services of water and 
ecotourism. Besides, a public domain for rural 
communities and national parks is essential to build 
communication and dialogue about conservation 
policies and rural communities' welfare.  
Fifthly, because PAMSIMAS is a community-based 
program, community participation should be at the 
center of its implementation (Asminar, 2019). The 
case study showed the degree of group participation 
in the decision-making process will influence program 
implementation. Thus, initial knowledge about the 
actors and their strategic positions is essential to 
ensure their influence and interests and to deal with 
such power imbalances. Encouraging genuine 
participation across actors in different groups will bring 
greater impacts and reduce power and information 
asymmetries (García & Bodin, 2019). Also, regular 
participatory monitoring and evaluation of the 
program are essential (Pratama & Isnanik, 2018) to 
ensure PAMSIMAS providing more sustainable water 
and sanitation in rural areas. 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
The study, which focuses on such sensitive areas 
as national parks, disclosed some critical issues in 
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government-directed rule in PAMSIMAS program, 
namely the setting of water price (a market-like 
mechanism), has helped local communities improve 
the more efficient use of water and increasing water 
availability. However, PAMSIMAS program cannot 
reduce uncertainties in water access and transaction 
costs that the water users should bear due to two 
categories of inequalities. The first is due to different 
biophysical conditions and asymmetry of power and 
information among community members, which would 
inevitably influence PAMSIMAS program's 
performance. The second is inequalities resulting from 
conflicting property systems regarding land and water 
inside Mount Merbabu National Park, i.e., between 
state-property regime and common property regime. 
Thus, It has impacted as well on uncertainties in water 
access and transaction access. 
By highlighting these two categories of inequality, 
this study suggests that the rule-making regarding 
water management in PAMSIMAS program prioritizes 
rational and legitimate pricing by considering both 
economic benefits and public interests. The 
recognition of local characteristics must be 
incorporated into water management policies, 
including the biophysical conditions and different 
attributes of communities in a project area. To ensure 
the balance between different water management 
priorities, it is suggested that the village government 
exercises its broad range of authority to govern “local-
scale matters”, especially by issuing relevant village 
regulations and carrying out the effective governance 
of local natural resources. Furthermore, government’s 
recognition of common property rights is essential to 
provide incentives and opportunities for local 
communities to manage their resources sustainably. 
Last but not least, since PAMSIMAS is a community-
based program, genuine and inclusive participation 
among community members must be the primary 
concern throughout its implementation.  
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